10.6084/m9.figshare.4903517.v1
Lin Chao
Santiago F. Elena
Figure S1 from Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from prisoner's dilemma to snow drift
2017
The Royal Society
cooperation
defective interfering particles
game theory
prisoner's dilemma
snow drift
RNA viruses
2017-04-24 13:57:58
article
https://rs.figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Figure_S1_from_Nonlinear_trade-offs_allow_the_cooperation_game_to_evolve_from_prisoner_s_dilemma_to_snow_drift/4903517
Comparing Monte Carlo and numerical solutions for evolved values of i. Solutions obtained as described in Materials and Methods. Individual points represent i values obtained by the Monte Carlo (MC) and numerical solutions. MC simulations were run for 10,000 generations with population size of N = 500m, where m is group size, and a mutation rate of u = 0.2 and a Gaussian distribution of mutational effects with mean zero and standard deviation = 0.005. Populations generally reach equilibrium values after 1000 generations (figure 2A). Reported values of i are the mean value at the last generation. The parameter space represented in figures 4A-D was explored by letting m range from 2, 3, 4, …, 10 and 1 + e from 1, 1.1, 1.2, …, 3.0. Values of i corresponding to PD (+) and SD (●). The match between MC and numerical solutions yielded a value of r2 = 0.96.